Maternity leave for unmarried employee.

@ Mr A Roy,
There is no burden to the state government unmarried lady female employee as well as the widow of a died employee – who got government job due die-in-harness policy of government after 1 year time of the death of her husband.
The provision of take action against those types of employee by the society is a type of hipocracy. But the Indian law never restricts such types of act – the right of illegal child is very equal with the legal child.
I like to say that, living together is a common phenomena in the society which is running side by side with the general practice.
As the Managing Committee is the appointing authority and most of the members are having political background – so the decision of the MC will also depends upon the temperament of the local public and in most of rural schools the MC could be act like a moral police.
Prostitution is not a crime in India, but that should be practiced in a specified area. The question arises are they engaged in their public service or not, actually, in real sense, they are serving the public. Indian law never declared prostitution is a legal thing but it never speaks opposite of it too! Being prostituted by somebody is a crime not the prostitution.
Mr A Roy, giving the biological birth of a child by an unmarried mother or by a widow after 280 days of death of her husband is neither a crime nor an illegal thing in respect of law but the matter of social effect – it is also depends upon the locality, rate of literacy and other social aspects.
As per Constitution of India there will no rule could be made to stop ones freedom of living ones life.
In this context I like to refer the writing of SREENIVAS, Mytheli, The Ohio State University,UK:
Between divine marriage and mundane prostitution: Devadasis and categories of singleness in late colonial India.
This paper investigates categories of singleness in modern South Asia , a region with one of the highest rates of marriage globally. Specifically, I focus on devadasi women in Tamil Nadu (southeastern India) during the first half of the twentieth century. Ritual specialists who were figured as the “wives” of deities in Hindu temples, devadasi women could not marry mortal men; however, many of these women maintained sexual relationships with upper caste Hindu patrons. Although their association with sacred spaces and royal authority in pre-colonial India offered devadasi women certain possibilities outside of marriage, this unique status considerably eroded under the colonial regime. By the early twentieth century, devadasis were regulated as a separate caste of “prostitutes” by the colonial state; at the same time, Indian reformers sought to abolish the devadasi institution by eliminating these women’s divine marriages in favor of weddings with mortal men. Thus occupying a liminal position between unmarried/married – between “divine wife” and “mundane prostitute” – devadasi women offer a fruitful vantage point from which to examine the multiple links between gender and marital status in late colonial India.
Existing historical research on devadasis has both investigated their work as ritual specialists in Hindu temples and interrogated their changing legal status vis-à-vis the colonial state. This paper seeks to open new directions in scholarship by focusing on the figure of the devadasi in relationship to developing categories of wifehood, prostitution, and singleness in the early twentieth century. With some attention to the interventions of nationalists and feminists – both important groups in debates about abolishing the devadasi institution – much of the paper examines the interventions of devadasis themselves. In so doing, I situate the demise of the devadasi institution as a distinct status for women in relation to a broader history of the transformation of marriage, family life, and categories of singleness in modern India.
Source: – Single Women in History 1000-2000

Dear friends,
The eligibility criteria for a mother to get Maternity Leave is that she shall be “with less than two surviving children”! It’s rather confusing because it appears that she must have one (less than two) surviving child! But all of us know ML is admissible for two children in separate spells. Why is the term “up to maximum of two surviving children” not used in place of “with less than two surviving children” in the rule? What’s the difference in meaning?
Pls help.
With regards.

Dear Mr. Ray,
Thank you very much for raising the valid points and, taking the matter further forward in view of understanding the crux of a rule and its operation which obviously varies in time and space.
Friend, frankly speaking, I did not assume that the grant of Maternity Leave in the first case relates to a State Govt. female employee on mere consideration of the merit of the second case which evidently pertains to a Central Govt. female employee. There was no sufficient ground for me to believe that since the 2nd case was for a Central Govt. Employee then the first case with all reasonable certainties would always indicate a female employee of state govt. employ. I consider the two cases as independent of each other and, not mutually supplementary! Too much conjectural! When a thesis fails, hypothesis prevails!! Pls excuse me friend! What would have been the approach if there was no 2nd case in the communication of Ms. Dutta!
Yes, friend, I agree there is no scope of consideration of number of children, which may restrict liberal operation of rule 199 (Maternity Leave) in WB in parlance of the existing socio-economic condition of the State. Though rule 199 governing the Maternity Leave for the WB Govt. Employees was also “redrafted on the recommendations of the 2nd Pay Commission and Rule 43 of CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972, adopted under Notification No. 10300-F dated 01.10.86………” like many other rules of our State, yet it was adopted from the Central rule to the exclusion of the qualifying criterion of number of children that a female employee has at that given point of time. I have no hesitation to say that it has definitely made the rule more flexible! Here is the contrast! In so far as the eligibility criterion relates to the consideration of “with less than two surviving children”, provision of this rule differs from the Maternity Leave Rule 43 of the Central Civil Service (Leave) Rules, 1972. Furthermore, it also shows disparity with the Maternity Leave rule promulgated in many other States in conformity with the two children norm of the Centre. Maybe that our State is an exception in this regard!
I have judged the case from one angle and you have done from other angle – both the possibilities have been explored. Good for the achievement of objective of this forum!
Indeed, a State Govt. has power to make rules as per its requirements, which may differ from others.. Admissibility of Paternity Leave is also not there in our State unlike the Centre and few other States.
Friend, it is interesting to note that the Hon’ble Madras High Court in J.Sharmilla Vs, The State of Tamil Nadu case (W.P.(MD)NO.13555 of 2009 and M.P.(MD)NO.1 OF 2009) opined in favour of number of pregnancy and not number of children as the criteria for grant of Maternity Leave with full pay.
In reference of the ground of disqualification of persons having more than two living children (in terms of restrictions under The Haryana Panchayati Raj Act, 1994) from contesting election to village Panchayat the Hon’ble Supreme Court opined, “In our view, disqualification on the right to contest an election by having more than two living children does not contravene any fundamental right nor does it cross the limits of reasonability. Rather it is a disqualification conceptually devised in national interest.” (Ref: Javed v. State of Haryana case in 2003)
“A just social order can be achieved only when inequalities are obliterated and everyone is provided what is legally due. Women who constitute almost half of the segment of our society have to be honoured and treated with dignity at places where they work to earn their livelihood. Whatever be the nature of their duties, their avocation and the place where they work, they must be provided all the facilities to which they are entitled. To become a mother is the most natural phenomenon in the life of a woman. Whatever is needed to facilitate the birth of child to a woman who is in service, the employer has to be considerate and sympathetic towards her and must realise the physical difficulties which a working woman would face in performing her duties at the workplace while carrying a baby in the womb or while rearing up the child after birth. The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 aims to provide all these facilities to a working woman in a dignified manner so that she may overcome the state of motherhood honourably, peaceably, undeterred by the fear of being victimised for forced absence during the pre- or post-natal period.
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When a question came up for consideration before this court in respect of a woman employee, who sought for maternity leave with pay for her third delivery in terms ………… this court had observed as follows:
There is no provision fixing any ceiling on the number of deliveries made by a female worker. So long as Art.42 of the Constitution read with the provisions ……… is available, every female worker ….is entitled to claim maternity benefits without any ceiling on the number of deliveries made by them. That will be the correct interpretation which will be in tune with the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in B.Shah V. Labour Court, Coimbatore and others
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if the intention of the State Government is to afford protection of the woman for her second delivery, then it should not be based upon the number of children she delivers during those two deliveries. The importance has to be seen only from the health point of the woman Government servant and not the number of children one delivers during each delivery.”
ON THE OTHER HAND THE SAME COURT OBSERVED THAT:
“Laws can be made to restrict the benefits to achieve Family Planning :
The Supreme Court in more than one decision tried to justify the rule restricting the benefits beyond two child norm based on public policy and family planning as the goal of the State. In this regard, the following passage found in paragraph extracted below:
For the reasons given above, we strike down the last portion of Regulation 46(i)(c) and hold that the provision on first pregnancy which-ever occurs earlier is unconstitutional, void and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution and will, therefore, stand deleted. It will, however, be open to make suitable amendments in the light of our observations and on the lines indicated by Mr Nariman in the form of draft proposals referred to earlier so as to soften the rigours of the provision and make it just and reasonable. For instance, the Rule could be suitably amended so as to terminate the services of an AH ( Air Hostess) on third pregnancy provided two children are alive which would be both salutary and reasonable for two reasons. In the first place, the provision preventing third pregnancy with two existing children would be in the larger interest of the health of the AH concerned as also for the good upbringing of the children. Secondly, as indicated above while dealing with the Rule regarding prohibition of marriage within four years, same considerations would apply to a bar of third pregnancy where two children are already there because when the entire world is faced with the problem of population explosion it will not only be desirable but absolutely essential for every country to see that the family planning programme is not only whipped up but maintained at sufficient levels so as to meet the danger of over-population which, if not controlled, may lead to serious social and economic problems throughout the world.”
In context of relaxation of provisions of rule 199 (Maternity Leave), I have been informed that compulsion of containment of population explosion is yet to take its course in this State, as it is already there at the Centre and in few other States. Time is not ripe!

….give your decisions in the following cases?
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(2) A female central govt. employee (divorcee) got married to a person whose wife expired leaving behind two children. About two years after marriage the lady gave birth to a child. Her Controlling Authority sanctioned Maternity Leave on the basis of her application but, there is an objection from the H.Q. that ML is not admissible in this case because, on the date of marriage with the person, she became mother of two children who were born through the first wife of her husband. She has became very frustrated and, as advised by others, submitted a prayer for special consideration of her case! Waiting for the reply from office!

In this particular case she became a STEPMOTHER of the two children soon after marriage with the person. On giving birth to a child for the first time after marriage, she became a MOTHER to qualify for grant of Maternity Leave.
Here too, I am not in a total agreement with you. Maternity rules of central Govt. does not specify pregnancy or physical motherhood though the essence of the rule is that. Now, another question may be raised, if a mother (legal, not biological) is entitled to get a quantum of leave for her adopted child, why she will not be entitled to get leave for the legal child (from her husband’s earlier marriage), specially when the leave rule does not prescribe any ‘physical motherhood’. I think it would be too early to derive at any conclusion. We need more study and some clarification from the authority empowered to clarify.
Yes, I also agree with you that a plain reading of the rule 43 of CCS (Leave) Rules, 1972 does not make us believe that grant of Maternity Leave is dictated by pregnancy or childbirth!
But, the primary concern of rule 43 (Maternity Leave) was to take care of the welfare of mother and child. It is also granted in cases of induced abortion (and not threatened abortion). The term “welfare” refers to the health condition of both mother and child. Otherwise, it would be simply a Child Care Leave which speaks of the upbringing (welfare) of children. A stepmother never suffers from labour pain for stepchildren! It’s only for a biological mother. Pain of childbirth is such a punishment that only a mother can realisel! It is needless to say that rules are made to account for the general cases. Friend, from the observation of Madras Court there is not an iota of doubt in me that the Maternity Leave was intended to favour the women employee who were pregnant.
An unmarried mother also gets Maternity Leave for pregnancy &childbirth (“physical motherhood”). Otherwise she is entitled to Child Adoption Leave under Rule 43-B of CCS (Leave) Rules,1972 if it is not related to pregnancy. Child Adoption Leave which is another kind of Maternity Leave is also have bar of two children norm.
Stepmother may be an exception. Exceptions do not make rules nor render the rule irrelevant.
Friend, it is a forum to discuss the rules and their applications in different situations. We are not rule makers rather, executer of rules in our workplaces. Indeed, I believe in the “spirit of the rule” which is not always there in the rule books but, it is reflected in the court verdicts which make us understand the proper applications of rules in a critical situation. You have smelt the essence of pregnancy/childbirth as the rationale of provision of Maternity Leaves, I observed the fumes! We are not the decision makers in the instant case. Just we can discuss! I fear I have crossed my limit! Pls excuse me!
With regards.

Dear friend Mr Ray,
As far as I have seen, relaxation of restriction of number of children in the provision of Rule of Maternity Leave is there in WB. I have already stated that few other states and the Centre stick to the two children norm. A mother may be eligible to avail of Maternity Leave for more than two children in this State as per extant rule 199 while she is eligible for Child Adoption Leave for a maximum of two children – how to account for these contrasting approach! This allows me to address another issue in this forum.
With regard.